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AFTERTHOUGHTS OF THE INSTITUTE ON
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AT CLEVELAND, JULY, 1938*
At this Institute, attended by about five hundred lawyers
from all parts of the United States, the eighty-six rules of
the new code of Civil Procedure for the Federal District
Courts, effective September 16, 1938, were discussed in detail.
Starting with Rule One, it was pointed out that the scope of
the new rules extends to all civil suits in law and equity with
certain exceptions as prescribed in Rule 81, such as bankruptcy and copyright, etc. .

.

. about which a word will be

said later. The rules apply in the Federal District Courts and
the question arises whether they extend to Hawaii or the Virgin Islands, etc. Congress will, no doubt, amend the organic
act to include all district courts as it appears expedient.
As the rules are considered, it should be kept in mind that
they only apply to practice and procedure and in nowise extend to substantive law. The new rules is in one sense a misnomer as these rules are a composite of rules that have very
considerably been tried and tested in England, in the Federal Courts, and likewise in various code states. A few are
original, while others have their source in the Federal Statutes such as the Equity rules of 1912 and 1915.
One of the chief purposes of the new Federal Rules is to
have the states follow them and eventually conform to them
to the extent that the substantive law of each state will permit. Which new policy is a reversal of a policy that has prevailed during the last one hundred fifty years. Heretofore,
the Federal Rules were promulgated with the idea of con* [Because of the widespread dissemination of the Federal Rules, it is thought
that these observations, made by a learned student of procedure, will prove valuable to the reader notwithstanding the readily available text of the Rules is not
set forth herein. Editor.]
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formity to the practice and procedure in the forty-eight
states and it was just this impossible situation that made the
new rules imperative.
Rule Eighty-one, among other things, states that the new
rules do not apply to either bankruptcy or copyright unless
the Supreme Court of the United States promulgates a rule
to the contrary. It is expected that the Supreme Court will
make a rule during the Fall term to the effect that the new
rules should apply to bankruptcy and copyright.
Some of the rules present interesting sidelights. For example, the basic rule two which unites law and equity adopts
the usual rule of the code states to the effect that, "There
shall be one form of action to be known as 'Civil Action'."
This rule, evolved from the New York code of 1848, is
found in substance in the modern code states. (In Illinois
the new Civil Practice Act has practically the same language). Rule Three provides that a civil action is commenced
by filing a complaint with the court and thus differs, for example, from the New York rule which requires that the defendant must be served. Rule Four applies to process and section D relating to personal service should be particularly
noted as it is the result of a compromise between the strict
and the liberal theories of what constitutes personal service.
Also note Rule Four (d) 7, which is a sort of catchall provision
relating to personal service. Likewise Rule Four (f) is notable for an interesting provision that makes a change in the
law by enlarging the territorial limits of effective service in
some cases.
Rule Six as to time, section (b), should be observed because it permits the court to enlarge considerably the period
of time originally specified for either affirmative or negative
performance. Section (c) of the same Rule provides that the
expiration of a term of court does not change the discretionary rule as to the enlargement of the time period by the
court. Rule Seven illustrates the policy of the new rules as to
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simplicity by the short pleadings it sets up. The modern
source of this rule can be seen in the New York Code. Rule
Eight relates to general rules of pleading and subdivision (8)
to claims for relief, among other things provides that relief in
the alternative or of several different types may-be demanded
in a single case. Rule Eight (c) which is modeled on the English practice as well as that found in a few code states provides that affirmative defenses will be necessary in certain
instances. Rule Eight (d) provides that if you fail to speak
when called upon, you are presumed to have admitted the
fact in issue. Rule Eight (e), par. 2 again shows the flexibility of the new Federal rules by providing that you are not
limited to the single weapon theory as it permits you to
choose as many theoretical weapons as you think your case
needs. In other words, the common law sporting theory is not
the theory of the new rules since you need not select any single weapon and rest your success on it but can use that which
seems most expedient.
In Rule Ten (b) the second sentence should be noted:
"Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in
a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates
the clear presentation of the matter set forth." The committee drafting the rules thought that this was the best way to
handle a question that often comes up as to whether there is
one cause of action with several claims or whether the several
claims were sometimes separate causes of action. The new
rule now leaves the matter in the hands of the trial courts.
Rule Eleven as to signing of pleadings contains the following, "The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleadings . . ." This came from
the old Equity rule and is mentioned because it illustrates
how the new rules are a composite of many tried rules. Note
the aspect of the penalty against an attorney that this rule
entails for improperly signing a pleading. Rule Twelve pro-
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viding for a twenty day service of an answer after being
served with a cross claim might be noted and also that the
twenty day period is enlarged to sixty days when the United
States is the party served. Rule Twelve (b) should be given
a glance because it prescribes how defenses should be presented.
Rule Thirteen (a) provides for compulsory counterclaim
and has been added on the modern theory found previously
in the Federal Equity rules and also in some states, -that you
should settle all matters you litigate in the same action and
provides that if you fail to do this you cannot later file a
separate action. Rule Thirteen (b) as to permissive counterclaims contemplates dragging out all matters involved in the
action and is based on the modern theory of giving the action
a wide rather than a narrow scope.
Rule Fourteen, Third-Party Practice, is a very important
new rule that evolved from the modern practice in states such
as New York. It is a 1938 short cut to settle many claims in
one action. This is a very broad rule permitting the bringing
in of third parties. A lawyer attending the Institute asked
Dean Clark whether in a motor carrier case this rule permitted the bringing in of insurance companies and when he
answered "Yes," those in attendance uttered more Ahs and
QHs than they did about any other rule that came before the
Institute. Later Dean Clark pointed out that the bringing in
of the insurance company as a third party must be limited by
the conditions prescribed in the rule. There was much ado
over this aspect of the rule but it was finally pointed out that
as the third-party practice permitted by this new rule merely
seeks to provide a remedy for existing gaps in the law, Major
Tolman cited the case of the corporation officer sued individually for statutory liability imposed upon corporate officers
where the corporation no longer existed. Although there were
other officers and stockholders equally liable under the then
existing law it took about five years before it was decided
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after various appeals that the officer who had been sued
alone was liable. After judgment against him under the old
practice, he could bring in third parties equally liable and
compel contribution. Note that this was five years after the
original suit and necessitated new actions. If Rule Fourteen
had been in effect at that time, the officer sued individually
could have immediately brought in as third parties, the other
officers and stockholders who were equally liable to share the
burden.
Rule Fifteen (b) providing that amended pleadings conform to the evidence is important and section (c) of the same
Rule concerning the relation back of the amended pleading,
should be considered in the light of an attempt to get away
from the rule in some states that the Statute of Limitations
bars the action whenever the amendment involves either a
new cause of action or a new legal theory.
One of the most important of the new rules is the Sixteenth, Pre-Trial Procedure. Although it evolved from England and some of the states, it has been in recent years developed in such cities as Boston, Los Angeles, and Detroit. The
origin of pre-trial procedure in Detroit is interesting . . .
it started out with mechanic lien cases and gradually was
extended piece-meal to other types of cases and finally it
went all the way and included civil cases generally. Though
only in its incipiency it seems to be recognized that this new
remedy of pre-trial is one of the best for the purpose of overcoming expense and delay. At the outset pre-trial should be
understood as not taking away a single right, although it does
aid "discovery" and helps to stabilize the docket. The object
of this remedy is not to have a settlement without a trial by
jury, but there is. one thing that the few available statistics
show about this practice and that is that a large number of
cases are settled without a jury and many are settled before
they reach the final stages of trial. Further sidelights on pretrial practice are given in the report of the committee on Pre-
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Trial Procedure of the American Bar Association as approved
July 25, 1938, at the annual meeting in Cleveland, which approves pre-trial practice and urgently recommends its adoption in all the metropolitan courts.
Rule Seventeen relates to the capacity of parties plaintiff
and defendant either to sue or be sued and is rather liberal
in scope. This rule in substance follows the rules adopted in
the more modern code states. In paragraph (b) of Rule Seventeen it should be noted that the law of an individual's
domicile determines his capacity to sue or be sued. But when
a corporation is a party, the law under which it was organized applies. Likewise the application of this paragraph to
unincorporated associations should be observed, especially as
to labor unions, even though it only restates existing law as
to them and does not state a new law as the labor unions
contended in the Congressional Committee hearings.
Rule Eighteen (a) as to joinder of claims is very liberal
and permits practically unlimited joinder of claims . . . and
Rule Eighteen (b) as to joinder of remedies is likewise liberal and among other things provides, "In particular a plaintiff may state a claim for money and a claim to have set aside
a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money."
Rule Nineteen (a) as to necessary joinder of parties includes this unusual provision, "When a person who should
join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff." For example, the underscored portion of the previous sentence would
apply where an assignor of a patent would not come in. It is
well also to note Rule Nineteen (b) as to the effect of the
failure to join, namely, the court can go forward with the
proceeding as this rule cuts down the scope of "Indispensable
parties." Rule Twenty (a) as to permissive joinder of parties
is fairly wide and adopts the common test of law or fact that
is found in modern acts such as the Illinois Practice Act. (Of
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course you can trace the source of this rule to England and
states like New York and Illinois.) The common law rule was
not as broad as Twenty (a) as the new rule is really an evolution of the more liberal equity rule as to joinder of parties.
In passing to Rule Twenty-two as to Interpleader it is to be
noted that when you look at Rule Twenty as to Joinder and
Rule Twenty-two as to very liberal interpleader, they seem
to be alike, in fact they are in many respects except Rule
Twenty-two expressly does away with the technical rules of
Interpleader and fuses in the bill in the nature of a bill of
Interpleader to make for a more practicable and justiciable
result.
Rule Twenty-three as to Class Actions is an attempt to
restate the rule of equity as to the doctrine of representative
suits . . . and Rule Twenty-three (3) should be especially
noted which provides as to a spurious class suit that if it is
several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought, the doctrine of representation applies. Rule Twenty-four tells you
when you can intervene and provides that a motion to intervene stating the grounds is the agency to employ. Rule
Twenty-five as to Substitution of Parties in case of death,
incompetency, or transfer of interest, carries over the equity
rule and the statutory rule found in many states with a few
variations; and Rule Twenty-five (d) should be noted . . .
it vvas inserted to get around the federal decision which held
if an injunction is obtained against a public official, Mr. X,
and he dies and Mr. Y becomes his successor, the injunction
against Mr. X was not extended to Mr. Y, his successor . . .
now it is by Rule Twenty-five (d).
Rules Twenty-six to Thirty-seven as to depositions and
discovery should be read as a series of links in a new chain
allowing liberal discovery where there was often none before.
The whole law of discovery has been liberalized by virtue of
the new rules. Heretofore you really had no discovery in the
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federal courts as you had in the state courts. Now you have,
by virtue of these rules, as broad a discovery in the federal
courts and may be a little wider than you have in the state
courts. Rules Twenty-six to Thirty-seven must be read in the
light of adding a wide jurisdiction to an extremely restricted
area . . . and as to perpetuation of testimony in Rule Twenty-seven, it should be noted that it gives an option to use
either the state or the federal rule, namely; if a deposition
can be used in a state court in Illinois for example, it can be
used in a federal court . . . or you can follow the federal
rule Twenty-seven.
In order to avoid abuse, the new rule as to discovery provides in Thirty (d) and Thirty (e) certain rather novel penalties. Rule Thirty-four as to discovery and the production
of documents and things for inspection, copying, or photographing, should be read with one eye on Rule Thirty-five,
Physical and Mental Examination of Persons. It is to be
noted that the latter rule depends upon an affirmative order
of the court. Rule Thirty-six, Admission of Facts and of Genuineness of Documents, should be carefully perused as it is
very extensive and sort of reverses the former practice by
now requiring affirmative action to avoid admission.
Rule Thirty-eight preserves the right of jury trial. Then
Rule Forty-one, Dismissal of Actions, should be noted and
at the same time one might contrast it with the old rule in
Illinois that you could take a non-suit any time before the
judge read the instructions. There was a question raised
about Rule Forty-one . . . Is It Procedural? The answer
was given that it is procedural since this rule states the effect
of dismissal and an opinion of Chief Justice Marshall of the
Supreme Court of the United States and also an English
case was cited in support of that position.
Rule Forty-four, Proof of Official Record, was doubly interesting to me when I found out that Col. John H. Wigmore
wrote it. It is an attempt to bring order out of chaos and
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state a simple, workable rule. Rule Forty-seven (b) provides
for alternate jurors

.

. . either one or two as the court may

direct. Rule Forty-eight in line with enlightened thought,
provides for juries of less than twelve and majority verdicts
and is quite a change from the common law rule.
Rule Fifty, Motion for a Directed Verdict, avoids the trap
that in times past caught the unwary, by providing, "A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have
moved for directed verdicts." Rule Fifty-two, Findings by
the Court, is very important and among other things is an
example of a modern equity rule being used as a source for a
rule in the new code. It reads in part, "In all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts
especially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon
and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment

.

."

Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Rule Fifty-four (b) is outstanding as it permits a
split judgment that is found in some of the state codes.
Along with this rule (relating to Judgments) Fifty-four (c)
should be noted as to Demand for Judgment as it incorporates the general practice of the codes, and note for example

.

.

.

"Every final judgment shall grant the relief to

which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled even
if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
Next one should note Rule Fifty-six, Summary Judgment,
as it incorporates the best ideas of today and widens the
scope of the Summary Judgment as it applies to all cases and
attempts to frustrate stalling by permitting one, in situations
wbere stalling was used in the past, to ask for a Summary
Judgment as a matter of law. Rule Fifty-seven, Declaratory
Judgments, provides for rather extensive use of that remedy
as it states, "The existence of another adequate remedy does
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where
it is appropriate." This overcomes the doubt that prevails as
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to whether you could use the declaratory judgment in the
alternative. Rule Fifty-eight on Entry of Judgment calls for
notice of the fact that "The notation of a judgment in the
civil docket as provided by Rule 79 (a) constitutes the entry
of the judgment; and the judgment is not effective before
such entry."
To again see how the 1938 Federal Code has used modern
sources, note Rule 60 (b) as to Mistake; Inadvertence; Surprise; Excusable Neglect and then compare it with the California code and note the similarity of expression. Rule Sixtyone, Harmless Error, is an important provision that has been
inserted to take the sting out of Harmless Error,and seeks to
protect a judgment from such objections that have often unfairly upset it in the past. Rule Sixty-five, Injunctions, further illustrates another source of these new rules, namely,
existing federal statutes. Rule Seventy, Judgment for Specific Acts; Vesting Title, among other things provides, "If
real or personal property is within the district, the court, in
lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may enter a judgment
divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others and
such judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in
due form of law."
Rule Seventy-seven (b), Trials and Hearings, referring to
Hearings states, "But no hearing, other than one ex parte,
shall be conducted outside the district without the consent of
all the parties affected thereby." Rule Eighty-one (c) Removed Actions, is important and you will note to quote from
it that, "Repleading is not necessary unless the court so orders." Rule Eighty-three, Rules by District Courts, permits
the local district federal judges to make local rules for their
district and the local rules are final unless the Supreme Court
otherwise provides. By virtue of Rule Eighty-six, these rules
became effective September 16, 1938.
John W. Curran.
DePaul College of Law.

